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ABSTRACT 
In the 1980s, the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) became the dominant measure of 
protection in applied studies of international agricultural trade.  This paper analyzes 
potential biases in the ratio form of the PSE introduced by using actual domestic 
prices rather than social opportunity costs in the denominator.  It is shown that doing 
so introduces a consistent under-estimation of the effects of trade restrictions and 
other price-support policies, relative to deficiency payments and other income-support 
policies.  It is found that under plausible conditions this bias leads the PSE to rank 
protection levels across countries or crops incorrectly.  In a sample of 250 activities 
across 33 countries, such errors were found to occur in 5 % of crop comparisons and 
8 % of country comparisons, including a number of politically sensitive cases.  An 
improved formula would therefore provide significantly more accurate results than the 
conventional PSE, with no additional data or more restrictive assumptions. INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental concern of applied economists is measuring how government policies 
affect economic incentives.  The need for new measures has been particularly pressing 
in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, as  negotiators attempt to reach beyond 
previous tariff reduction agreements to reduce previously unregulated non-tariff 
interventions, particularly in agriculture.  Such negotiations are hampered in part by 
the difficulty of knowing how quotas, deficiency payments, land set-asides, and other 
such policies affect production, trade and welfare.  Their impact depends on a variety 
of interactions in the economy, which can be described only with a relatively complex 
model.  Such models are constantly being improved, and at anyone time it is difficult 
for economists or government officials to agree on the specification and parameters of 
one "true"  model. 
To establish common ground in national and international policy negotiations, it is 
helpful to have some simple measurement tool on which all sides can agree.  Such a 
measure might be less accurate than a fully-specified economic model, but it is easier 
to understand and use as a basis for negotiation.  In recent years the most prominent 
candidate for this role has been the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), a measure 
used informally in GATT negotiations and actually written into legislation for the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area (Bredahl 1990, p. 4). 
The PSE was developed by Josling in the early 1970s (Josling 1973), and is defined 
generally as  "the level of producer subsidy that would be necessary to replace the 
array of actual farm policies employed in a particular country in order to leave farm 
income unchanged.  It can be thought of as the 'cash' value of policy transfers 
occasioned by price and non-price policies"  (Josling and Tangermann 1989, p. 346). 
In this way, the PSE provides an aggregate tariff-equivalent measure of many 
different interventions. 
To make comparisons across crops and countries, some unit-free indicator is needed; 
the most common is the "percentage" PSE, or the total PSE divided by farmers' 
current revenue.  This ratio is intuitively appealing, as it is based on farmers' actual 
receipts rather than some hypothetical opportunity cost.  The percentage PSE thus 
appears to be a simple accounting measure,  and not the output of an economic model 
based on behavioral assumptions and  "what-if" scenarios.  Josling (1990) emphasizes 
this point, writing that "the definition of a PSE is not based on  knowledge about the 
no-policy situation", although he admits that "to add up the effects of various 
instruments it is indeed useful to calculate the effects of each (relative to its absence) 
and add them up." (Josling 1990, p.  6). 
In the 1980s, the percentage PSE quickly became the dominant empirical measure of 
policy effects in agriculture.  Initial estimates by  the F AO (1975) were followed by 
large-scale USDA (1988) and OECD (1991)  studies, both of which are updated 
periodically and are considered authoritative in the press (e.g. Carr 1992).  The PSE 2 
has also attracted some critics, who generally focus on the problem of aggregating 
support from different types of interventions.  For example, Hertel (1989a,  1989b) 
demonstrates how the mix of support instruments influences their aggregate effect; de 
Gorter and Harvey (1990) and Roningen and Dixit (1991) propose alternative 
measures,  focusing specifically on how interventions affect welfare or trade.  In each 
case,  the improved measure requires introducing an equilibrium model of how 
quantities would change in response to  new government policies.  This allows more 
precise measurement, but could not be used as a basis for policy negotiations without 
agreement on the structure and parameters of the model being used. 
In this paper, we assume that it is precisely the absence of an equilibrium adjustment 
model that has made the PSE so popular.  We accept as given the limitations of the 
data and of the "subsidy equivalent" concept itself.  Instead we focus on the index-
number properties of the ratio used  to compare subsidy-equivalents across crops and 
countries, to determine the appropriate denominator.  This line of research follows 
Peters (1989), who suggests that placing current revenue in the denominator of the 
PSE introduces a number of "quirks and ambiguities" into the measure,  all of which 
"could be avoided by nothing more fundamental than a change of base"  (p.  209). 
Changing the denominator of the PSE to farmers'  revenue at border prices (or,  more 
broadly, national opportunity costs) instead of market prices would produce an 
indicator like the "Subsidy Ratio to Producers"  (SRP) introduced in a different context 
by Monke and Pearson (1989).  The OECD has recently begun calculating an SRP-
type measure as an alternative to the PSE (OECD  1993); they term it the "Nominal 
Assistance Coefficient" (NAC).  Official OECD estimates of the NAC are expected to 
be included in the forthcoming DECD  report on  "Agricultural Policies, Markets and 
Trade:  Monitoring and Outlook 1993." 
OECD analysts have long noted the possibility of changing the denominator of the 
PSE (e.g. Cahill and Legg  1989/90, p.  16), but they make no judgment as to  whether 
one denominator might be preferable to another.  Here, we show that using domestic 
market prices causes the conventional PSE to understate the effects of product trade 
policies, relative to domestic or input-market interventions.  We show that the 
SRP/NAC eliminates this bias, changing both the absolute magnitude and the relative 
levels of measured protection for a number of important crops and countries.  In each 
case, both the PSE and the SRP use identical data, and are equally subject to errors in 
those data -- but the formula itself is shown to have a substantial independent effect 
on measurement accuracy. 
THE PSE AND ALTERNATIVE MEASURES 
Josling's percentage PSE is an adaptation of the far older Nominal Protection 
Coefficient (NPC), which shows how  much government policies raise or lower a 
product's current market price (P)  relative to the product's social opportunity cost 
(P), usually taken to be the product's import or export value: 3 
(1) NPC  =  PIp· 
The NPC concept (and the use of trade values as reference prices), dates back at least 
to Book IV of The Wealth of Nations, in which Adam Smith assessed  the effects of 
England's Corn Laws by comparing the domestic price of wheat with import costs. 
To aggregate the effects of both product and input market policies,  the oldest measure 
is the Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC).  The EPC shows how much government 
policies raise or lower value added (VA) -- returns to labor, land and capital -- earned 
in producing a good:  its product price (P) minus per-unit input costs (I), or the sum 
of all input prices (PJ weighted by their input/output coefficients (aj): 
The EPC was introduced by Barber (1955), and has been widely used since the mid-
1960s -- but in the context of highly protected activities the denominator (VA*) 
becomes small or even negative, and the EPC becomes unstable and hard to interpret. 
Josling's PSE was introduced in part to overcome the instability of the EPC, by 
focusing directly on the net effect of government policies.  In terms of prices,  the 
percentage PSE is: 
(3) PSE = (..1P-..1I)/P  = [(P-P*)-(I;j~Pi-I;jaiPi*)]/P 
where ..1P and ..11  are the net effects of policies on product price and input costs, 
respectively.  Depending on the context,  ..11  may be defined either narrowly or 
broadly,  "to accord with what is politically agreeable"  (Joslingand Tangermann 
1989, p. 346).  The narrowest PSEs would include only tradable inputs (like the 
EPC), whereas a broader PSE could include factor payments (such as deficiency 
payments). 
The PSE's simplicity and flexibility makes it useful in a wide range of discussions, 
but it is also a weakness:  by using fixed input-output coefficients (aJ, the PSE 
abstracts from any variation in  marginal productivity or substitution effects, and by 
measuring each reference price (P*)  individually, the PSE abstracts from any general-
equilibrium or cross-price effects.  Thus the PSE serves as a kind of index number, 
indicating the aggregate tariff-equivalent of a set of policies with no allowance for 
economic adjustment.  Such an  index does not always measure how policy affects 
quantities produced, consumed and traded, but doing so would require an equilibrium 
adjustment model -- and it is precisely where such  models are not available that the 
PSE is needed. 
The absence of an economic adjustment model introduces some error into the PSE, 
but that error is inevitable.  In contrast, the choice of denominator introduces a 4 
consistent bias that can readily be removed.  To demonstrate this, we must first 
decompose the PSE's denominator into the product's border price (P*)  and tariff-
equivalent effect of policy (.1P)  (equation 3') and compare this with the definition of 
the SRP (equation 4): 
(3') PSE  =  (.1P-.1I)/(p· +.1P) 
(4)  SRP = (.1P-.1I)/(p) 
The juxtaposition of equations (3') and (4)  highlights the fact that product-price 
effects (.1P) appear twice in  the PSE formula (equation 3'), once in the numerator and 
once in the denominator, whereas they appear only once in the SRP.  In this sense .1P 
is "double-counted" in the PSE, and the SRP formula simply removes this double-
counting.  The data and assumptions in  the two formulas are identical:  since .1P is 
defined as the difference between P and p. (equation 3), there is no information in the 
SRP that is not in the PSE. 
Given that the informational content is the same, does changing the formula matter? 
The PSE and SRP are both index numbers,  without cardinal meaning.  Their absolute 
level may be of interest to politicians and journalists, but has little economic 
importance.  For this reason,  economists have paid little attention to the choice of 
denominator, and have focused instead on  making the numerator of the PSE 
comparable across different crops and countries. 
Now that extensive databases of PSE results are available, however, it is clear that the 
share of taxes or subsidies given through trade restrictions and other product price 
policies (.1P), as opposed to deficiency payments and other policies (.11),  varies 
widely.  As a result, including .1P (but not .11) in the denominator of the PSE could 
not only affect the measured level of protection, but could also cause the relative 
rankings of two PSEs to be reversed.  In such cases the PSE would falsely suggest 
that one activity is more (or less) subsidized than another, when in fact the opposite is 
true.  Similarly, over time the PSE could falsely suggest that protection levels are 
constant or falling, when in fact they are rising -- simply because intervention is 
shifting from product prices (.1P)  to other mechanisms (.11). 
The conditions under which the PSE could give incorrect rankings (relative to the 
unbiased SRP) can be found algebraically.  When comparing activities "a"  and  "b", a 
ranking reversal is defined as: 
(5)  PSEa  >  PSBt,  and  SRPa  < SRPb 5 
As long as PSE., and SRPb are both positive, equation (5) is equivalent to: 
(5') PSE/PSE.,  >  1  >  SRP/SRPb 
Substituting in  equations (1)  and (2),  we obtain: 
In other words,  the PSE ranking will be incorrect relative to the SRP ranking when 
the ratio of market prices exceeds the ratio of total transfers,  which in turn exceeds 
the ratio of undistorted reference prices.  More intuitively, PSE ranking errors occur 
when one activity ("b") relies relatively heavily on product-price supports (the first 
inequality), and has a relatively high overall level of support (the second inequality). 
A more intuitive proof of the possibility of ranking errors from the PSE relative to 
the SRP can be given graphically, if we reduce the problem to two dimensions. 
Assuming that scale effects are minimal, this can be done by normalizing all activities 
to a common level of revenue (P*).  Figure 1 shows all such normalized activities, in 
terms of their mix of product-price support (llP) and input-cost subsidy (llI).  The 
sets of activities sharing a given level of PSE and SRP (say,  PSEa and SRP  J are 
given by solving equations (3) and  (4)  for llP in terms of llI: 
(7) llP =  [SRP Jep· - III 
The set of activities which share PSEa form a line of slope [l/(PSEa-1)], while 
activities which share SRPa form a line of slope minus one.  Only when  the PSE is 
zero (and hence the SRP is also zero) do these lines coincide.  Ranking errors occur 
whenever activity "a", for example, is compared with another activity in the shaded 
areas between the lines.  Activities such as  "b"  receive relatively more product-price 
supports whose effects are underestimated by the PSE, so that PS~ <  PSEa but 
SRPb  >  SRPa•  The reverse would be true with activity "c".  In either case, the PSE 
gives an incorrect ranking relative to the SRP. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
How important is the potential 
bias in the PSE?  The frequency 
with which double-counting 
causes ranking errors can best be 
assessed by comparing PSE 
results with SRPs calculated from 
the same data, over a large 
sample of observations.  For this 
study, preliminary data from the 
USDA are used, covering the 
principal crops in each of 33 
countries, for the 1983 through 
1989 crop years.
l 
The USDA data are estimates of 
how much each type of policy 





production costs for each crop in  Figure 1. 
each country.  These are then 
Set of all activities 
with PSE(a) 
Set of all activities 
with SRP(a) 
I) 
aggregated into PSEs as in equation (3).  Analogous SRPs were obtained by 
subtracting from the denominator of the PSE all policies that directly affect product 
prices (.6P in equation 3).  This removes the double-counting bias, by converting the 
denominator into a country-specific estimate of each product's opportunity cost (P"). 
Policies classed as affecting product prices (.6P) were trade interventions such as 
import quotas, variable levies, export enhancements, marketing board losses or 
profits, and the effects of state trading controls.  Domestic policies such as deficiency 
payments or credit programs were classed as payments to factors,  affecting production 
costs (.61)  but not price.  This distinction holds exactly for goods which are fully 
traded onto a large world market,  so that shifts in domestic supply or demand do not 
move prices; in other cases it is only approximately correct, as changes in production 
costs also affect prices. 
2 
1.  These data have been collected as part of an ongoing project to update and extend 
the results published in USDA (1988); they are not official USDA estimates.  Copies 
of the data files may be obtained from  the author, or directly from the Economic 
Research Service of USDA. 
2.  A more refined distinction between product-price and input-cost effects would 
require a more realistic model, specifying supply and demand functions for each 
trading partner.  To obtain approximate results without such models, it is necessary to 
(continued ...  ) 
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Because PSEs (and SRPs) can fluctuate considerably from one year to  the next, the 
analysis here considers only the 1983-89 period average PSE leve1.3  There are a 
total of 250 period-average PSEs in  the sample, distributed across the 33 countries. 
The resulting number of distinct activity pairs to be compared is 250 x 24912  = 
31, 125.  Spreadsheet macros were used to determine that of these 31, 125 possible 
pairs, a total of 1,572 were ranked differently by the PSE than by the SRP, for an 
error rate of just over 5 %.  Although many of these errors are of little practical 
significance\ some do have important policy implications. 
For national policy formation,  the most important measurements concern the 
incidence of policy across crops within the given country.  Selected examples are 
given in Table 1.  In the U.S., for example, analysts using the PSE would argue that 
wheat production was more protected than barley production during this period, 
whereas the SRP shows the opposite to have been true.  Such a result could influence 
any effort to equalize or otherwise adjust support levels across crops within the 
United States.  A similar error arises within Mexico when comparing soybeans and 
corn.  An example in a country where agriculture is taxed rather than subsidized is 
given for India. 
2(  ...  continued) 
make the simplifying assumption that output is fully traded at constant prices.  But if 
more realistic models were available, results could be derived directly from them and 
PSEs/SRPs would not be necessary. 
3.  The average year-to-year coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by 
mean) for the PSEs in this sample was  33 %.  The SRPs, in contrast, were a much 
more stable measure over time, with an  average coefficient of variation of only 19%. 
4.  An example of an insignificant ranking error arises between Jamaican pimentos 
and Nigerian cocoa.  These two crops enter completely different markets,  so their 
PSEs are unlikely to be compared in any policy setting. 8 
TABLE 1. SELECTED NATIONAL PSE AND SRP COMPARISONS, 1983-89 








PSE  SRP 
36.3%  79.2% 
41.4%  70.4% 
56.5%  87.9% 
59.2%  61.7% 
-43.3%  -13.7% 
-27.2%  -19.7% 
Source:  Calculated from  preliminary USDA file data. 
For international trade, the most important measurement issues concern how policies 
in different countries affect a given crop.  Three of the most potentially important 
errors in such comparisons are shown in Table 2.  For example, analysts using the 
PSE to study the US-Mexico grain trade would find greater subsidies for wheat 
production in Mexico than in the U. S., whereas the SRP shows the opposite to have 
been true.  A similar result occurs in the dairy market when comparing the European 
Community with Canada, and in  the sheepmeat market when comparing the EC with 
New Zealand. 
TABLE 2. SELECTED INTERNATIONAL PSE & SRP COMPARISONS, '83-89 
Wheat  United States 
Mexico 




PSE  SRP 
41.4%  70.4% 
43.3%  53.2% 
71.2%  249.1 % 
114.0%  134.9% 
54.2%  118.9% 
71.5%  71.5% 
Source: Calculated from preliminary USDA file data. 
In some contexts, analysts might want to compare average support levels across 
countries.  Such comparisons could show which country gives more protection to 
agriculture in general, taking account of each country's unique crop mix.  For this 
study, national-average PSEs and SRPs were calculated by weighting each crop by its 
total value (price times quantity) to producers in that country.  With 33  countries, 9 
there are 528 distinct country comparisons (33x32/2).  Of the 528 possible pairs, 41 
(7.8 %)  were ranked differently by the PSE than by the SRP.  A complete table of 
these results, including a matrix showing all ranking reversals,  is given in the 
appendix; some of the more significant examples are given in Table 3.  In each case, 
the PSE underestimates aggregate intervention levels in countries that rely heavily on 
trade interventions, relative to countries which use more domestic interventions and 
have more open borders. 
TABLE 3. SELECTED AGGREGATE PSE &  SRP COMPARISONS, 1983-89 
PSE  SRP 
Taiwan  24.0%  45.7% 
United States  25.6%  42.1% 
EC-12  45.3%  103.1 % 
Canada  46.7%  54.6% 
Thailand  8.2%  36.0% 
Indonesia  18.9%  30.3% 
Source:  Calculated from preliminary USDA file data. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results presented here show that there is a systematic bias in the PSE measure, 
and that this bias can cause the PSE to give misleading results in a significant number 
of cases.  Bias in the PSE is caused by placing market prices rather than reference 
prices in the denominator, which makes the PSE intuitively easy to understand but 
counts product price supports in both the numerator and denominator.  Counting price 
policy twice leads the PSE to understate the effects of that type of policy, and can 
cause relative PSE rankings to be incorrect when comparing one crop or country with 
another.  An improved measure can be obtained without additional data by dividing 
the components of the PSE into product-price and input-cost effects, and subtracting 
product-price effects from the denominator to obtain an estimate of reference-cost 
values.  This removes the bias, giving more accurate results.  In a USDA sample of 
250 products over 33 countries for the 1983-89 period, the improved measure gave 
better rankings in 5 % of individual-crop comparisons, and 8 % of aggregate national 
comparisons.  The cases of ranking reversal include a number of comparisons which 
could be of significance in domestic or international policy negotiations, highlighting 
the importance of using the improved measure wherever possible. 10 
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APPENDIX:  TABLE  OF  NATIONAL  AVERAGE  SRP/PSE  ESTIMATES  AND  MATRIX  OF  RANKING  ERRORS,  1983-89  PERIOD 
-----.--------------------------------------------------------.-----------------------------
EC-12  Yugo.  Czech.  Indon.  S.Afr.  Kenya  Colombia  Pakistan 
SRP  PSE  Chile  Taiwan  Thai l.  USSR  Hungary  Egypt  Nigeria  Jamaica 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japan  593.4  74.5 
South  Korea  230.2  73.4 
Venezuela  157.6  63.8 
EC-12  103.1  45.3 
Chile  72.8  18.5  + 
Yugoslavia  60.4  28.8  +  (-) 
Canada  54.6  46.7 (-) (-) (-) 
Poland  47.2  26.5  +  (-)  + 
Mexico  46.5  26.2  +  (-)  + 
Taiwan  45.7  24.0  +  (-)  + 
United States  42.1  25.6  +  (-)  +  (-) 
Czechoslovakia 37.1  10.6  +  +  +  + 
Thailand  36.0  8.2  +  +  +  + 
Indonesia  30.3  18.9  +  (-)  +  +  (-) (-) 
USSR  29.8  17.1  +  +  +  +  (.) (- )  + 
South  Africa  26.2  14.8  +  +  +  +  (-) (-)  +  + 
New  Zealand  22.9  22.7  +  (-)  +  +  (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
Hungary  20.9  11.6  +  +  +  +  (-) (-)  +  +  + 
Bangladesh  20.8  14.4  +  +  +  +  (-) (-)  +  +  +  (-) 
Kenya  13.5  5.3  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Egypt  12.6  -9.2  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Colombia  8.5  -27.3  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Austral ia  7.5  5.8  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  (-) (-) (-) 
Turkey  5.1  2.1  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  (-) (-) 
India  1.6  -0.6  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  (-) (-) 
Morocco  0.9  -0.9  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  (-) (-) 
Nigeria  -3.5  -21.1  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  (-) 
Argentina  -7.3  -10.4  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  (-) (-) 
Pakistan  -13.2  -37.0  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
China  -17.5  -31.5  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  (-) 
Jamaica  -20.8  -59.3  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Zimbabwe  -21.0  -37.9  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  (-) 
Algeria  -33.8 -114.6  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.-
NOTES:  SRP  and  PSE  results are averages  across all crops,  weighted  by  value to producers,  for 
the 1983-89  crop years.  Crop  coverage varies by  country and  year. 
Countries are ranked  by  SRP  level. 
In  the matrix,  n+n  indicates  that  the  PSE  and  SRP  give  the same  ranking  when  coq:>aring 
the two  countries;  n(_)n  indicates a  ranking  error; and  n.n  shows  duplicate pairs. 
SOURCE:  Calculated from  preliminary USDA  file data. 
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